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We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative 
sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two 
in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing 
technologies. A conflict is shown to arise between the young and the old, because the 
former favor innovation while the latter prefer learning. We model the interaction 
between overlapping generations and policy makers as a dynamic common agency 
problem, where competing generations invest a certain amount of resources to lobby 
either for the maintenance of the current technology or the adoption of a new one. By 
focusing on truthful Markov perfect equilibria, we characterize the political equilibrium 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Technological creativity, that is the application of new ideas to production, has an in-
herently cyclical nature. This regularity is sometimes called Cardwell’s Law (Cardwell,
1972; Mokyr, 1990): the group that plays the leading role in the advance of one period is
unlikely to play a similar role in the next period.
Our aim is to investigate the origin of such a cyclical behavior. More precisely, we
focus on the speciﬁc question why, when a new technology appears, the economy to which
it is proposed some times adopts it while other times it fails to do so even though the new
technology is freely available. This would be a trivial question to ask if economic forces
were all that mattered for technological choices: if a new technique increases proﬁts it
will be adopted by individualistic proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms, otherwise it will be discarded.
From the point of view of economic history, however, as reported by Bauer (1995), such
a decentralized market outcome seems to be a poor description of many technological
breakthroughs. This is not to say that economic convenience is irrelevant, but rather, as
argued by Mokyr (1998), that: “There usually is, at some level, a non-market institution
that has to approve, license or provide some other imprimatur without which ﬁrms cannot
change their production methods. The market test by itself is not always enough. In the
past, it almost never was” (p.1). The reason is the very nature of technological change
that leads almost inevitably to an improvement in the welfare of some and a deterioration
in that of others. Thus, as envisaged by Olson (1982), the decision whether to adopt a
new technology is likely to be resisted by losers through some kind of activism aimed at
inﬂuencing the decision by the aforementioned institution.
Accordingly, we model a situation in which, for exogenous reasons, technology adoption
is delegated to a regulatory authority. Its decisions are binding for all individuals in
the economy but can be aﬀected by interest groups. Based on historical evidence, the
central authority can be thought of as a licensing system that has some agency approve
new technology before it is brought to the market.1 As to interest groups, along history
they have ranged from labor unions to business associations, from giant corporations to
environmental lobbies.2
1As pointed out by Mokyr (1998, p.38), “almost everywhere some kind on non-marketing control and
licensing system has been introduced”. For instance, this role has often been played by the Crown (Heller,
1996). A more recent example is the creation of standard-setting agencies such as the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO).
2See, for example, Lorenz (1991) on labor unions as well as Coleman and MacLeod (1986) on business
associations.
1To capture in a simple way the evolving clash between conservative and progressive
interests, the economics of our model follows Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1996) as well as
Aghion and Howitt (1998). In particular, we consider an economy that, at any point in
time, is populated by two overlapping groups of individuals diﬀering in terms of their life
horizons. Productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and
learning-by-doing. At each point in time there is an incumbent vintage of an aggregate
technology. Such vintage can either be still improvable or obsolete. In the former case,
learning-by-doing can enhance its productivity, in the latter the scope for learning is
exhausted. Also, at each point in time, there is a new vintage, which is freely available
and, if adopted, becomes more productive than the old one only after some running in.
This initial productivity gap is the more severe the less learning has taken place on the
previous vintage. Therefore, there is a trade-oﬀ b e t w e e ni n n o v a t i o na n dl e a r n i n g - b y -
doing, which creates a potential conﬂict of interests between the long-lived (‘young’) and
the short-lived (‘old’) individuals who, due to their diﬀerent life horizons, tend to favor
innovation and learning-by-doing respectively.
Am o r es i g n i ﬁcant departure from the existing literature is made on the political side of
the model. Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1996) as well as Aghion and Howitt (1998) assume that
the intergenerational conﬂict is handled by democratic voting so that the interests of the
larger generation prevail. While an enlightening ﬁrst step, this approach is unsatisfactory
for two main reasons. First, when technological change is involved, public intervention
usually takes the form of regulation in areas such as product and security standards,
environmental policy, restrictions on entry, and trade barriers, which are the realm of
organized interest group action rather than of democratic voting (see, e.g., Viscusi, Vernon
and Harrington, 2000). Second, by attributing an overwhelming role to demographic
factors, democracy somehow obscures the underlying economic stances and the relevance
of market considerations, which may make it possible for a suﬃciently advanced technology
to break through despite reactionary institutions. This is stressed, for example, by Mokyr
(1990).
For these reasons, we model an alternative political mechanism, based on the action of
organized interest groups, that will be shown to yield a resolution of the intergenerational
conﬂict in which also economic factors play a relevant role. We build on the ideas of
Olson (1965) who argues that what matters for the success of special interest groups
are the relative surpluses that they are able to generate for their members, rather than
their relative demographic sizes. His insights have been recently formalized in terms of a
common agency set-up in which, in the wake of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), competing
2interest groups (principals) lobby an incumbent policy maker (agent)i no r d e rt oi n ﬂuence
her decisions (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Dixit, Grossman and Helpman,
1997). In our framework, this means that competing generations invest a certain amount
of resources in supporting either the maintenance of the current vintage technology or
the adoption of the new one. In so doing, they expect the policy maker to implement
the alternative whose support absorbs the larger amount of resources. This leads to the
characterization of the mechanics of interest intermediation in each period as a menu
auction game between two overlapping generations of principals and an agent who is also
assumed to be short-lived (speciﬁcally, one-period-lived).
We are not aware of any study of such a game and even related results are scarce. Berge-
mann and Välimäki (2003) investigate a dynamic common agency game with inﬁnitely-
lived players and propose the Truthful Markov Equilibrium concept that we also adopt.
Grossman and Helpman (1998) characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of a common
agency game of intergenerational distribution in which there are overlapping generations
but only the older is exogenously assumed to act as an active principal. Moreover, while
their policy space is continuous, our technology adoption choice is inherently binary. This
discrete feature will be shown to give rise to endogenous lobbying activity.3
Under the assumption that players are perfectly informed, that regulators maximize
total contributions by the pressure groups over their period in oﬃce, and that there a
no credit markets, we are able to show the following results. First, the identity of the
winning interest group depends on the relative surpluses of the two generations (hence,
on the underlying economic parameters) and their relative abilities to implement eﬀective
collective actions. Second, due to perfect information, only the prospective winning gener-
ation implements some collective action and ends up contributing an amount of resources
that is equal to the highest oﬀer the losing group could aﬀord (second-price). Third, as
the relative surpluses of overlapping generations vary from period to period depending
on the current technological status quo, a Cardwellian cycle involving periods of stagna-
tion being followed by periods of technological change may arise endogenously from the
competing actions of organized interest groups. Such an economic cycle is caused by an
endogenous political cycle of lobbies spending. Speciﬁcally, the cycle is likely to occur
in equilibrium when generations care little about the future, when new vintages are not
3As all cited contributions, we abstract from the crucial issue of endogenous lobby formation, that is,
how and why the relevant groups organize for collective action. As pointed out by Grossman and Helpman
(2001), theorizing about coalition formation has proved very diﬃcult even in static common agency games.
Thus, in extending the static model to an overlapping generations framework, we prefer to restrain from
addressing that issue.
3much more productive than old ones, when the initial costs of running in a new technology
are large, when positive learning spillovers from old to new vintages are strong, and when
population growth is slow.
Finally, since current policymakers and interest groups do not take into account the
impact of their choices on future generations and credit markets are absent, in general the
political outcome is dynamically ineﬃcient from the point of view of a social planner with
inﬁnite horizon. In particular, the equilibrium Cardwellian cycle turns out to be ineﬃcient
with respect to restless technological change whenever the introduction of new technologies
entails initial costs of running in that cannot be signiﬁcantly reduced by human capital
accumulated while working on old technologies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the mechanics of
the model. After presenting the political equilibrium concept, Section 3 solves the model
and analyzes its comparative statics implications. In particular, it studies the emergence of
endogenous cycles in relation to the underlying parameters. Welfare analysis is performed
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 Economics
Consider an overlapping generations framework consisting of individuals who live for two
periods only. Calendar time t is discrete and runs from 0 to inﬁnity. At any time t =
0,1,..,∞ two generations are alive: the old O and the young Y with lifetime horizons of
one and two periods respectively. Population grows at a constant rate n starting from an
initial level L0 =( 2+n) consisting of masses 1 and 1+n of old and young individuals
respectively. Therefore, at time tL t = L0(1 + n) individuals are alive.
Each generation is made of homogeneous indiv i d u a l s .A tb i r t ht h el i f e t i m ep r e f e r e n c e s






s is consumption at time s of an individual born at t and ρ ∈ (0,1) is the discount
factor.
Independently from their generation, all individuals supply inelastically one unit of the
sole factor of production, say labor L, which is employed to produce a unique consumption
4good X under constant returns to scale. At any time t per-capita output is given by:
xt = λAαt+1 (2)
where xt is per-capita output, λAαt+1 is labor productivity, and αt+1 is the vintage of the
technology adopted for production at time t.T h eﬁnal good cannot be stored and there
are no credit markets. Thus, in each period and for each generation, consumption equals
disposable income.
Labor productivity improves in time due to process innovation. Progress comes in the
form of new vintages of technology with each new vintage inducing an improvement of size
A ∈ (1,∞). A new vintage becomes available only one period after the previous one has
been adopted. However, the full exploitation of a new vintage technology requires learning-
by-doing. In particular, we assume that learning takes one period so that λ ∈ (0,1) when
the new vintage is introduced and λ =1after one period. Moreover, part of the learning
obtained on the old vintage spills over to the new vintage: λ = λ if learning-by-doing did
not occur on the old vintage, and λ = λ > λ if it occurred. The idea is that learning on an
old technology generates human capital that is partly useful to run the new technology.
Accordingly, when deciding whether to substitute the existing vintage with the new
vintage, individuals may face a trade-oﬀ between the productivity gains of learning-by-
doing and those of process innovation. In particular, for this to be the case we need to
impose:
λA<1 < λA (3)
The ﬁrst inequality in (3) states that, when some scope for learning still exists on an
incumbent vintage, there is a short-run opportunity cost of innovating. The second in-
equality requires that, when the scope for learning is exhausted, there is a short-run cost
in keeping the incumbent vintage.
The existence of a trade-oﬀ between innovation and learning-by-doing creates a po-
tential intergenerational conﬂict. The old, who will not be there next period, may prefer
the current productivity gains arising from learning on the existing vintage. On the con-
trary, the young, who will be alive next period, may like to trade such gains for future
productivity improvements stemming from current innovation.
2.2 Politics
Innovation policy is the outcome of a process of interest intermediation by public regula-
tors, who do not participate to production and consume out of the contributions made by
5interest groups to support alternative policy decisions.4 Regulators are assumed to live
for one period and have linear preferences over the consumption of good X.
Against this background, we model the mechanism of interest intermediation as a
common agency game. Each generation is exogenously organized as a pressure group
that has the opportunity of inﬂuencing the regulator’s decision through direct payments.
The speciﬁc mechanism we consider is a ﬁrst-price menu-auction game àl aBernheim
and Whinston (1986). In each period t the regulator selects an action and each lobby of
the living cohorts oﬀers a menu of contributions contingent on the action chosen. The
lobbies pay their announced contributions for the allocation ultimately chosen by the
regulator and this choice is made to maximize the regulator’s payoﬀ, given the menus of
oﬀers announced. A complication with respect to the original set-up by Bernheim and
Whinston (1986) comes from the fact that, in choosing their contributions at time t,t h e
current young must look ahead to period t+1. This is because they will still be around and
their future consumption will be aﬀected by both the policy adopted and the contributions
paid at that time.
Speciﬁcally, we extend the common agency model of Bernheim and Whinston (1986)
to a dynamic setting. In each period there are three players: an agent (the incumbent
regulator) and two principals (the lobbies of the current young and old). Players are
short-lived. The lobby of the current young live two periods while the regulator as well
as the lobby of the current old live for one period only. The lobby of the current young
becomes next period old lobby. Therefore, we have a dynamic common agency set-up with
one-period-lived agents and overlapping generations of principals.5
Each period t starts with an incumbent vintage technology αt inherited from period
t − 1 and a generation (the old) survived from the same period. The timing of events is
the following. First, at the beginning of period t the young generation is born and a new
regulator is appointed to decide on the vintage technology αt+1 to be used for production
in that period. She can innovate (hence, αt+1 = αt+1) or not (hence, αt+1 = αt). Second,
the young and old generations announce their contributions to the regulator contingent
on her technological choice. Third, the regulator makes her decision. Fourth, production
takes place according to the chosen vintage, consumption takes place and the announced
contributions are paid. Fourth, the old generation dies and the regulator expires. As to
4Diﬀerently from the common agency in Grossman and Helpman (1994) but closer in spirit to the menu
auction in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the regulator does not weigh public utility per se. See, also,
Footnote 11.
5Short-lived agents and overlapping generations of principals diﬀerentiate our extension from the dy-
namic common agency game with inﬁnitely lived players studied by Bergemann and Välimäki (1998b).
6period 0, we assume an initial vintage technology α0 =0that has still to be learned:
x0 =1if the ﬁrst regulator does not innovate and selects α1 = α0 =0 ; x0 = λA if she
innovates and selects α1 = α0 +1=1 .
Formally, the lobbies are indexed by i ∈ I = {Y,O}. I ne a c hp e r i o dt h er e g u l a -
tor can select an action (policy) pt ∈ P ∈ {I,N} where I and N stand respectively
for ‘innovation’ and ‘no innovation’. Each lobby oﬀers a reward scheme (contribution)
(ri(zt,I),r i(zt,N)) ∈ R2
+ which depends on the history zt and the action pt chosen by
the regulator in period t.L e trt ≡ (rO(zt,I),r O(zt,N),r Y (zt,I),r Y (zt,N)) b et h el i s to f
lobbies’ contributions in period t,p≡ (p0,...,p t,...) be the list of policies chosen in each
period and r ≡ (r0,...,r t,...) be the list of the lists of lobbies’ contributions in each period.
The history of the game in period t is zt ≡ (t,α1,....αt,r 0,...,r t−1,p 0,...,p t−1) for
t ≥ 1 where αt =
Pt
s=1 Fs with Fs =1for ps−1 = I and Fs =0for ps−1 = N.F o r
the initial period, history is z0 ≡ (0,0,∅,∅). The set of all possible t period histories
is denoted by Zt. The future in period t is the sequence of future actions and states
(t+1,....,αt+1,...,rt,p t)=( t+1,...,αt+1,...,r t+1,...,p t+1,...).W ed e n o t eb yZ(zt) the set
of all possible histories zt+1 which are accessible from history zt, and analogously Z(zt,p t)
the set of all possible histories zt+1 generated by zt and pt.
Both actions I and N can be implemented by the regulator with no inherent personal
beneﬁt. On the contrary, they are not indiﬀerent to the lobbies. The instantaneous ﬂow
beneﬁt of regulator’s action pt to lobby i is vi(zt,p t). A reward strategy for lobby i is a
sequence of mappings ri : Zt ×P→ R2
+ which assigns to every possible action pt ∈ P of
the regulator a nonnegative reward contingent on the past history of the game. A strategy
for the regulator is a sequence of actions p : Zt×R2
+ → P which depends on the aggregate
reward and history in period t.
With history zt the expected payoﬀ for the regulator of an action pt is the total reward
raised which consists of the current reward if in period t the action was pt and history was
zt:
m(zt,p t) ≡ rO(zt,p t)+rY (zt,p t)
The expected payoﬀ for the old lobby is the current ﬂow beneﬁt net of the regulator’s
reward:
hO(zt,p t) ≡ vO(zt,p t) − rO(zt,p t)
while the expected payoﬀ of the young lobby also includes the expected next-period ﬂow
7beneﬁt V (zt,p t) if in period t the action was pt and history was zt:
hY (zt,p t) ≡ vY (zt,p t) − rY (zt,p t)+ρV (zt,p t)
In principle, this game has a potentially large set of Nash equilibria. To limit their
number, we follow Bergemann and Välimäki (2003) and restrict our attention to truthful
Markov Perfect Equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria that are both ‘truthful’, in that the cor-
responding contributions correctly reﬂect relative preferences for the various alternatives
(as in Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) and ‘Markov perfect’ in that, in a stationary envi-
ronment, expected policies are not only self-fulﬁlling but also depend only on the values of
the state variable expected at that time (as in Maskin and Tirole, 2001). In so doing, we
disregard the purely strategic eﬀects of changes in states that are not relevant to payoﬀs.
Speciﬁcally, a strategy is said to be a Markov strategy if in any period t it depends only
on the calendar time t, on the initial vintage αt and on the previous period regulator’s
action pt−1. Consequently, a Markov strategy for lobby i in period t assigns to every
possible action pt ∈ P of the regulator a non-negative reward contingent on t, αt and pt−1.
Notice that, given the economics of the model, the previous period regulator’s action is a
‘natural’ state variable of the economy as current payoﬀs (and therefore current actions)
depend crucially on whether in the previous period there was a technological change or
not. Calendar time and vintage are relevant insofar as they determine the size of the
population as well as the level of income of the economy and, therefore, they aﬀect the
amount of contributions.
Deﬁnition 1 (Truthful Markov Strategy) A Markov strategy ri(t,αt,p t−1,p t) for lobby
i is said to be truthful with respect to (t,αt,p t−1, e p) if and only if for all pt ∈ P,e i t h e r
(i) hi(t,αt,p t−1,p t)=hi(t,αt,p t−1, e p)
or
(ii) hi(t,αt,p t−1,p t) <h i(e p,pt−1,t,αt),a n dri(t,αt,p t−1,p t)=0 .
In words, a lobby’s reward strategy that is truthful with respect to a certain action as-
signs zero reward to any other action that yields a lower expected payoﬀ to the lobby. That
is, a truthful reward strategy always reﬂects the relative values for the lobby of any two
actions unless the implied reward were negative, in which case, due to the nonnegativity
constraint, the actual reward is set to zero.
Accordingly:
Deﬁnition 2 (Truthful Markov Perfect Equilibrium) T h eM a r k o vs t r a t e g i e sr∗
O(t,αt,p t−1,p t),
8r∗
Y (t,αt,p t−1,p t) and p∗(t,αt,p t−1,r(·)) form a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in
truthful strategies if and only if:




(ii) for all t, αt,p t−1 there is no other reward function b rO(t,αt,p t−1,p t) such that
hO(t,αt,p t−1, b pt) >h O(t,αt,p t−1,p ∗
t)
where p∗ = p∗(r∗
O(·),r∗
Y (·)) and b p = b p(b rO(·),r∗





(iii) for all t, αt,p t−1 there is no other reward function rY (t,αt,p t−1,p t) such that
hY (t,αt,p t−1,pt) >h Y (t,αt,p t−1,p ∗
t)
where p∗ = p∗(r∗
O(·),r∗
Y (·)) and p = p(r∗







Y (·) are truthful strategies with respect to p∗(·).
3 The political equilibrium
Since the rate of population growth is constant and the technological gain due to innovation
is also constant (and equal to A) what is really crucial for the characterization of the
equilibrium of the game at any point in time is the previous period action of the regulator,
pt−1. In fact, information on pt−1 is suﬃcient to know which lobby is going to win the
auction in the current period t and consequently whether there will be innovation or not.
More speciﬁcally, we can show that contributions depend on calendar time t but regu-
lators’ equilibrium decisions are a Markov process for an appropriate state variable, that
is, the previous period regulatory decision. For the formal statement, we need to deﬁne
two threshold levels of λ,n a m e l y :
λ1 ≡
1+( 1+n)(1+ρλA)






Then, the following result applies.
9Proposition 1 Restless technological upgrading
Given vintage αt and calendar time t,t h es t r a t e g i e s
(r∗
O,r∗
Y ,p ∗)=( 0 ,(1 − λA)Aαt(1 + n)t,I) when pt−1 = I or t =0
(r∗
O,r∗
Y ,p ∗)=( 0 ,0,I) when pt−1 = N
form the only MPE in truthful strategies if and only if
max[λ1,λ2] < λ < λ < 1 (6)
Proof. See Appendix.
When condition (6) is satisﬁed, restless technological updating sustained by the orga-
nized collective action of the young takes place at every point in time and learning-by-doing
never happens. To understand when this is the case, we have to study the comparative
statics of λ1 and λ2: whatever decreases the value of the maximum among λ1 and λ2 also
enlarges the set of values λ supporting restless technological updating.
Some parameters relate to the static common agency models with lobbying, as ﬁrst
explored in Grossman and Helpman (1994). Among these are the technological parameters,
which mainly concern surplus issues. Restless innovation is less likely to occur when
the relative beneﬁt of the new vintage is weaker. In particular, ongoing technological
upgrading is less likely to emerge when the productivity gains implied by the new vintage
are smaller (smaller A), when the initial costs of running in are larger (smaller λ), and
when the positive spillover from learning on the old vintage to running in the new vintage
is stronger (larger λ). In all three cases the willingness of the young to pay for technological
upgrade is reduced.
Other parameters are inherently dynamic. These are the rates of time preference and
population growth. As it is intuitive, when the intertemporal discount factor ρ decreases
(increases), restless innovation is less (more) likely to occur. This is due to the fact that,
as ρ falls, the young care less about the future and are less likely to sacriﬁce current con-
sumption in order to adopt the new vintage technology. Smaller n makes innovation less
likely. This happens because the relative sizes of generations determine the intergenera-
tional distribution of output. In particular, as n is reduced, a smaller share of output goes
to the young, thus decreasing their relative ability to pay. Thus, as in ‘democratic’ models
àl aKrusell and Ríos-Rull (1996), demography plays a role in our context too.
When (6) is violated a Cardwellian cycle arises. A period of technological upgrade is
followed by a period of stagnation and viceversa. Growth alternatively relies on innova-
tion and learning-by-doing. This happens in three alternative scenarios. For the formal





Then, we can write:
Proposition 2 Cardwellian cycle
Given vintage αt and calendar time t,t h es t r a t e g i e s
(r∗
O,r∗
Y ,p ∗)=( λ(1 + n)t+1Aαt+1,0,N) when pt−1 = I or t =0
(r∗
O,r∗
Y ,p ∗)=( 0 ,0,I) when pt−1 = N
form the only MPE in truthful strategies if and only if




Y ,p ∗)=( [ λA − 1+ρA(λA − λ)]Aαt (1 + n)
t+1 ,0,N) when pt−1 = I or t =0
(r∗
O,r∗
Y ,p ∗)=( 0 ,0,I) when pt−1 = N
form the only MPE in truthful strategies if and only if:




Y ,p ∗)=( 0 ,0,N) when pt−1 = I or t =0
(r∗
O,r∗
Y ,p ∗)=( 0 ,0,I) when pt−1 = N
form the only MPE in truthful strategies if and only if:
0 < λ < λ3 (10)
Proof. See Appendix.
When (8) holds, the Cardwellian cycle stems from the liquidity constraint of the young
due to the absence of credit markets. As under (6), the young’s relative surplus from
restless innovation is larger than the old’s relative surplus from the cycle. However, now
the young’s current income is not enough to outbid the old. Diﬀerently, when condition (9)
is satisﬁed, the cycle arises because the relative surplus of the old dominates the relative
surplus of the young. In both cases, however, technological change is accompanied by an
11endogenous cycle of lobbies spending.6 Finally, under (10), there is no intergenerational
conﬂict and technological change takes place every second period.
In terms of comparative statics, condition (8) is more likely to hold than condition (9),
and this is more likely to hold than condition (10), the more generations care about the
future, the higher the productivity advantage of new vintages with respect to old ones, the
smaller the initial costs of running in a new technology, the weaker the learning spillovers
from old to new vintages, and the faster population growth.








in which case the liquidity constraint of the young is not binding so that (8) is never met.
Condition (11) holds when popula t i o ng r o w t hi sf a s t( l a r g en), because in that case a large
fraction of output goes to the young. It also holds when the young care little about the
future (small ρ) and the productivity gain from innovation is tiny (small A), because in
that case the contribution of future production to their discounted surplus is small, which
implies little need of borrowing.
4W e l f a r e a n a l y s i s
It is worthwhile noticing that, as long as the current young are not liquidity constrained
(i.e. (11) holds), since strategies are truthful the MPE entails the step-wise maximization
of lobbies aggregate welfare.7 However, even in this case, the MPE will be generally inef-
ﬁcient from a dynamic point of view because incumbent regulators and living generations
do not take into account the eﬀects of current technological choices on future generations’
welfare. In other words, as shown by Bergemann and Välimäki (2003), dynamic eﬃciency
6It is sometimes argued that the main function of a ﬁrm is to provide a way around the short planning
horizons of individuals. Accordingly, if the old could sell the ﬁrm to the young, it would be in the interest
of the former to innovate when this is good for the latter. This is not the case here. Indeed, to convince
the old to innovate, the young would have to make the old indiﬀerent between innovating or not. This
would imply a price of the ﬁrm that is equivalent to the second price of the menu auction. Thus, for
innovation to take place, the young would have to pay the old exactly what they pay the regulator for the
same outcome: technological choices are unaﬀected.
7The MPE is also Pareto eﬃcient. It does not exhaust, however, the set of Pareto eﬃcient sequences
as these include all sequences that do not feature (pt−1,p t)=( N,N) at any t: since learning to use a new
vintage technology takes one period only and, once acquired, such learning spills over to the next vintage,
no lobby would beneﬁt from resisting innovation at t when no innovation has taken place at t − 1.
12of dynamic common agency games requires inﬁnite planning horizons.8
More speciﬁcally, we can rank in welfare terms the two alternative technological tra-
jectories associated with restless technological updating and the Cardwellian cycle respec-
tively. In so doing, we consider the point of view of an inﬁnite-horizon benevolent planner
who compares the corresponding discounted sums of aggregate output from time 0 to




[ρ(1 + n)]tAt (12)
w h i l ea l o n gt h eC a r d w e l l i a nc y c l ei ti s :
ENI ≡ L0[1 + (1 + n)ρλA]
∞ X
t=0
{[ρ(1 + n)]2A}t (13)
where L0 =2+n and p0 = N.
Assuming convergence of the two series in (12) and (13),9 we get:
EII =
L0λA
1 − (1 + n)ρA
and
ENI =
L0[1 + (1 + n)ρλA]
1 − [(1 + n)ρ]2A
Simple inspection reveals the intuitive result according to which restless upgrading
tends to be superior to the cycle when the short run drop in productivity due to the
adoption of a new vintage is small (λ large) and the learning spillover from the old to the
new vintage is unimportant (λ small). More precisely, EII is larger than ENI whenever λ
is larger than:
λo ≡
[1 + (1 + n)ρλA][1 − (1 + n)ρA]
A[1 − (1 + n)2ρ2A]
(14)
This expression deﬁnes the threshold value of λ above which the planner would deliver
restless technological upgrading.10 It is interesting to compare λo with the threshold value
8See the Appendix for a discussion of the case of an inﬁnitely-lived regulator facing overlapping gener-
ations of lobbies.
9This requires assuming ρ(1 + n)A<1 and [ρ(1 + n)]
2A<1.
10Indeed, it can be shown that the surplus maximizing sequence of innovations is either restless innovation
or the Cardwellian cycle depending on whether λ is larger or smaller than λo respectively.
13λ1 above which restless innovation is the decentralized outcome when the current young
are not liquidity constraint. However, since, due to the many parameters and restrictions,
a general comparison turns out to be unwieldy, we prefer to restrict our attention to a
speciﬁc though suggestive case. In particular, assume that λ is 1, that is the spillover
from old to new vintages is at its maximum. In that case, it is easy to show that λ1 is
larger than λo so that, when λ falls in between those two values, decentralization yields
a Cardwellian cycle while the planner would rather have ongoing innovation. This is due
to the fact that, when the spillover is strong, in the period after a new vintage has been
introduced the young may want to postpone its upgrade in order to draw from the existing
technology some experience that will lower the initial costs of running in the next vintage.
In particular, we have:
|λ1 − λo|λ=1 =
(1 + n)2ρ2(A − 1)
[1 − (1 + n)2ρ2A]
(15)
which shows that the range of values of λ for which the Cardwellian cycle is ineﬃcient
expands as ρ, n,a n dA grow.
Though speciﬁc, these results single out the source of ineﬃciency, namely the shorter
planning horizon of the individuals with respect to the planner. When deciding in a decen-
tralized fashion, existing individuals do not take into account the beneﬁt of technological
upgrading for the future generations’ productivity. This beneﬁt increases with the size of
the technological step A and its importance for the planner increases with the economy
discount factor ρ a n dw i t hp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hn.
More precisely, ineﬃciency stems from the lobbies’ rather than the regulator’s short-
sightedness. To see this, consider the point of view of an inﬁnitely lived regulator who
has to choose between restless technological upgrading and the Cardwellian cycle. For
simplicity, assume that λ =1and liquidity constraints do not bind. Being inﬁnitely lived,
the regulator takes into account the bids of all current and future generations. Therefore,
for her to favor perpetual innovation over Cardwellian cycle it must be the case that her
valuation of the joint highest bids of all young generations is larger than her valuation of
the joint highest bids of all old generations. Straightforward calculations show that:
λo < λ1 = λr =1 /A when λ =1 (16)
where λr is the threshold value for λ above which the regulator prefers restless innovation
to cycle. Accordingly, the inﬁnitely lived regulator behaves as the regulator who lives for
one period. This is due to the nature of the menu auction, in which the auctioneer is a
14passive executor of the policy supported by the winning bid. Thus, it is the short planning
horizon of the lobbies that generates ineﬃcient outcomes.11
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has constructed a model where the interaction between organized special inter-
ests and policy makers generates political equilibria that involve either restless innovation
or alternating periods of technological change and stagnation (Cardwellian cycle). With
respect to existing ‘democratic’ models àl aKrusell and Ríos-Rull (1996), the prevailing
equilibrium has been shown to depend not only on the demographic structure of the pop-
ulation but also on technological and preference parameters. In particular, cycles arise
in equilibrium when special interests and policy makers put little weight on future con-
sumption and when the introduction of new vintage technologies is hampered by initial
learning costs that are reduced if some experience has been gained on previous vintages.
In any case, technological change is accompanied by endogenous political cycles of lobbies’
spending and, since current decisions do not take into account the well-being of future
generations, its pattern will be generally ineﬃcient from a dynamic point of view. The
more so the larger the short-run learning costs of innovation with respect to its long-run
productivity gains.
The model can be used to link international income diﬀerences to the national propen-
sities to adopt new technologies (see, e.g., Prescott, 1998). When facing similar technolog-
ical opportunities (same A), better performing countries should be characterized by more
patience (larger ρ), more abundant and more ﬂexible human capital (larger λ’s), more
eﬃcient credit markets (softer liquidity constraints on project with delayed payoﬀs), and
younger demographic composition (larger n). Another qualiﬁcation provides additional
insights. As pointed out by Olson (1965), it is not members’ relative numerosity per se
that drive a lobbies’ success but rather their relative eﬃcacies in the process of interest
intermediation. Under this respect, we can conclude that better performing countries
should be those who are able to grant fairer political access to all interests.
From a technical point of view, the main contribution of the paper is the analysis of
common agency in a dynamic setting with overlapping generations of principals. Its main
limitation is its abstraction from the issue of how and why interest groups organize for
11The results would diﬀer if the regulator cared not only about contributions but also about public utility
per se (see, e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1994). In particular, as long as the objective of the regulator
attached some weight to future aggregate welfare, the ineﬃciency of her decisions would be mitigated.
15collective action. Indeed, as argued by Olson (1965), some interests are more diﬀuse in the
society than others and thus their organization faces more severe free riding problems. This
is because those who share a lobby’s objective can beneﬁt from its activism even without
supporting its contributions. The relevance of this problem grows with the number of
people sharing the common objective, because opportunistic behavior is more diﬃcult
to control within large groups. Speciﬁcally, in our setting population growth implies
that the young exceed the old so that their collective action would be more diﬃcult to
organize. By reducing the relative eﬀectiveness of young interests, this would further
increase the ineﬃciency of the lobbying outcome and reinforce suboptimal cycles against
restless technological progress.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1 In a truthful MPE pt−1 = N it never follows pt = N.
Proof. Whenever in the previous period the regulator did not innovate, that is pt−1 =
N, (3) implies that in the current period both groups beneﬁt from innovation.
Thus, in equilibrium, whenever pt−1 = N, it must be that pt = I.
17Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The game is a ﬁrst-price menu auction where the winner pays the highest bid
that makes the loser indiﬀerent between winning and losing (see Bernheim and Whinston,
1986). Accordingly, we need to ﬁnd the conditions under which, given pt−1 = I,t h er e g u -
lator, notwithstanding the opposition by the old, implements the policy that is sponsored
by the young, namely pt = I. This happens when the regulator prefers (pt−1,p t)=( I,I)
to (pt−1,p t)=( I,N), which is the case if and only if at time t the highest bid the current
young are willing and able to pay is larger than the highest oﬀer the current old are willing
to make. The liquidity constraint is relevant only for the young, because, diﬀerently from
the old, their current incomes may not be enough to signal their life-long interests to the
one-period regulator.
Consider what would be true were the current young able to pay any desired contribu-
tion. When deciding at time t, the regulator takes into account the bids of those who are
young at time t. Therefore, for her to favor (pt−1,p t)=( I,I) over (pt−1,p t)=( I,N) it
must be that her valuation of the highest bid of the current young [λAαt+1 + ρλAαt+2 −
(Aαt + ρλAαt+1)](1 + n)t+1 is larger than her valuation of the highest bid of the current
old generation (Aαt − λAαt+1)(1 + n)t. Simple manipulations show that this happens
whenever λ > λ1, in which case the young generation ends up contributing the highest
bid that the old would be willing to pay (Aαt − λAαt+1)(1 + n)t.
Consider now what the current young are indeed able to pay. In the absence of capital
markets, they have to cover their current bids in favor of innovation by current incomes.
Therefore, they will be able to pay what is necessary to outbid the old if and only if
λAαt+1(1 + n)t+1 is larger than (Aαt − λAαt+1)(1 + n)t. Straightforward manipulations
reveal that this is true insofar as λ > λ2.
So, whenever λ > max[λ1,λ2], the current young are willing and able to convince the
regulator to implement (pt−1,p t)=( I,I) by oﬀering the contribution r∗
Y =( 1+n)t(Aαt −
λAαt+1).
Finally, when pt−1 = N, both lobbies beneﬁt from innovation. In this case, the only
truthful Markov perfect equilibrium is for both lobbies not to contribute and for the
regulator to innovate.
As to the initial period t =0 , the assumption of an initial vintage technology α0 =0
that has still to be learned imply that period 0 is analogous to any period t such that
pt−1 = I.
18Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Whenever λ1 < λ < λ2, the current young are willing but unable to convince
the regulator who ends up delivering (pt−1,p t)=( I,N) after accepting a contribution by
the old equal to the maximum that the current young can aﬀord, namely r∗
O = λAαt+1(1+
n)t+1.
Irrespective of liquidity constraints, whenever λ < λ1 the regulator’s valuation of the
bid of the current young generation is smaller than the value of the highest bid of the
current old generation. In this case, she implements the policy sponsored by the old who
contribute the highest bid of the young r∗
O =[ λAαt+1 + ρλAαt+2 − (Aαt + ρλAαt+1)](1 +
n)t+1.
Moreover, also the young support (pt−1,p t)=( I,N) against (pt−1,p t)=( I,I) when-
ever the latter makes them worse oﬀ than the former. This happens insofar as [λAαt+1 +
ρλAαt+2 − (Aαt + ρλAαt+1)] < 0,t h a ti s ,λ < λ3. In this case, the only Nash equilibrium
is for the lobbies not to contribute and for the regulator not to innovate.
The inﬁnitely lived regulator
In the main text we have investigated the ineﬃciency of the choices made by one-period-
lived regulators. Here we show that the ineﬃciency is not removed but only mitigated
by considering the case of an inﬁnitely-lived regulator. The reason is the short planning
horizon of lobbies.
Consider the point of view of an inﬁnite-horizon regulator who has to choose between
restless technological upgrading and the Cardwellian cycle. In so doing, she compares the
corresponding discounted sums of contributions from time 0 to inﬁnity. For simplicity, we
abstract from liquidity constraints.
Since she is inﬁnitely lived, the regulator takes into account the bids of all current and
future generations. Therefore, for her to favor restless upgrading over the cycle, it must be
that her valuation WII of the joint highest bids of all young generations is larger than her
valuation WNI of the joint highest bids of all old generations. As to the former valuation,
we have:




19As to the latter valuation, we have instead:




The regulator favors (pt−1,p t)=( I,I) over (pt−1,p t)=( I,N) if and only if WII >W NI.
Assuming the two series converge (i.e., δ(1 + n)A<1 and δ2(1 + n)2A<1 respectively),
then she will opt for restless technological upgrading if and only if λ is larger than:
λ0
1 ≡
[1 − δ(1 + n)A]+( 1+ρλA)(1 + n)[1 − δ2(1 + n)2A]
A{(1 + ρA)(1 + n)[1 − δ2(1 + n)2A]+[ 1− δ(1 + n)A]}
This can be compared with the planner’s threshold (14) and the threshold of the
one-period-lived regulator (4) after setting δ = ρ to abstract from the implications of an
inﬁnitely-lived regulator’s idiosyncratic time preference. Such comparisons yield:
λo < λ0
1 ≤ λ1
with equality in the special case of λ =1 . Being less conservative, the inﬁnitely lived
regulator makes more eﬃcient decisions than the one-period lived one (unless λ =1 ).
Nonetheless, she does not reach full eﬃciency because the planning horizon of the lobbies
is still too short.
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